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COURTS
Civil Cases: Limitation on Time for Filing
CODE SECTION: O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (amended)
BILL NUMBER: SB 17
ACT NUMBER: 734
SUMMARY: The Act allows renewal of civil cases after
dismissal where the original cases were
filed in state and federal courts.
History
The history of this provision of the Code is outlined in Clark v. New-
some.' In 1847 the Legislature passed a renewal act providing that in any
case which had been discontinued or dismissed or in which the plaintiff
had been nonsuited that the plaintiff could renew the case in any state
court within six months of such termination. Such right to renew was
extended to only one renewal.2
In 1856 the Legislature added another provision to the renewal act: if
the judgment is withheld because of some error apparent from the fact of
the record, the case could be brought again in state court within six
months of the termination of the case.3 In the 1863 Code the statutes
were codified, and the renewal act of O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, prior to the 1985
amendment, retained basically the same language as its predecessors.
Clark v. Newsome was only one of numerous cases brought under the
renewal act in which the court held that a plaintiff would be permitted to
renew his cause of action within six months of dismissal, even though the
action would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. The act
was considered remedial in nature and was to be literally construed.4 The
Georgia Supreme Court did not extend renewal to cases originally
brought in federal courts.
Constitution Publishing Co. v. DeLaughter5 addressed the question of
the applicability of the renewal act to cases which originated in federal
courts. The court stated that "the manifest intention of the legislature"
was that the renewal act "should apply only to State courts" and was not
1. 180 Ga. 97, 178 S.E. 386 (1935).
2. 1847 Ga. Laws 217.
3. 1855-56 Ga. Laws 237.
4. Cox v. Berry, 13 Ga. 306, 310 (1853).
5. 95 Ga. 17, 21 S.E. 1000 (1894).
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to be enlarged to include actions brought in federal courts."
In Henson v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co.,7 the court applied the rule
in Constitution Publishing Co. to conclude that the plaintiff's case was
barred by the statute of limitations since it had been originally filed in
federal court before its dismissal. The court commented that the well set-
tled law of the State is that the renewal act could not be extended to
cases orginally brought in federal courts.
The federal court upheld this interpretation of the renewal act in Di-
versified Mortgage Investors v. Georgia-Carolina Industrial Park Ven-
ture.8 The case law also indicates that where the original action was com-
menced in state court and removed to federal court where it was
subsequently dismissed, the action could not be renewed in state court.'
SB 17
The Act deals with voluntary dismissals in federal courts to encourage
the filing of causes of action in state courts after dismissal in federal
courts. The amendment broadens the scope of the renewal act and its
remedial aspect of allowing the dismissed case to stand on the same foot-
ing as the original case as long as it is filed within six months of dismissal.
6. Id. at 18, 21 S.E. at 1000.
7. 144 Ga. App. 80, 84, 240 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1977).
8. 463 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
9. See Cox v. East Tenn., Va. & Ga. R.R., 68 Ga. 446 (1882); Ivester v. Southern Ry.,
61 Ga. App. 364, 365, 6 S.E.2d 214, 215 (1939).
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